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Abrar Ullah*, Hannan Xiao, Trevor Barker and Mariana LilleyAbstract
Student authentication in online learning environments is an increasingly challenging issue due to the inherent
absence of physical interaction with online users and potential security threats to online examinations. This study is
part of ongoing research on student authentication in online examinations evaluating the potential benefits of
using challenge questions. The authors developed a Profile Based Authentication Framework (PBAF), which utilises
challenge questions for students’ authentication in online examinations. This paper examines the findings of an
empirical study in which 23 participants used the PBAF including an abuse case security analysis of the PBAF
approach. The overall usability analysis suggests that the PBAF is efficient, effective and usable. However, specific
questions need replacement with suitable alternatives due to usability challenges. The results of the current
research study suggest that memorability, clarity of questions, syntactic variation and question relevance can cause
usability issues leading to authentication failure. A configurable traffic light system was designed and implemented
to improve the usability of challenge questions. The security analysis indicates that the PBAF is resistant to informed
guessing in general, however, specific questions were identified with security issues. The security analysis identifies
challenge questions with potential risks of informed guessing by friends and colleagues. The study was performed
with a small number of participants in a simulation online course and the results need to be verified in a real
educational context on a larger sample size.
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Authentication1. Introduction
This study investigates student authentication in online
learning and examinations. Student identification in on-
line learning is largely reliant upon remote authentication
mechanisms. The absence of face-to-face identification
can make online learning and high stakes examinations
vulnerable to a number of authentication threats and
therefore, the security of online learning environments is
highly important. Online learning offers a number of ad-
vantages including availability, reliability, flexibility and re-
usability [1,2]. Besides the anticipated benefits of online
learning, it has some limitations including the security of
online examinations as one of the major concerns.* Correspondence: abrar.ullah@gmail.com
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in any medium, provided the original work is pIn typical online environments, examination is an inte-
gral part of the learning process. In online examinations,
face-to-face invigilation is often replaced with authenti-
cation systems and therefore, security becomes a critical
factor with regard to their credibility. Secure authentica-
tion is particularly relevant to the success of high stakes
online examinations. Effective authentication approaches
are important to ensure secure, reliable and usable stu-
dent authentication mechanisms in an online learning
and examinations context. The implementation of a reli-
able and secure approach to students’ authentication is
vital to ensure trust of the stakeholders in the assess-
ment process. It has been an active research area and a
number of authentication techniques have been imple-
mented in order to ensure secure online examinations.
A diverse set of authentication techniques have been de-
veloped in earlier research work, which verify onlineOpen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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knows” [3], possession of objects or “What one has” [4]
and biometrics or “What one is” [5].
In our earlier study [6], we developed the Profile Based
Authentication (PBAF) approach for student authentica-
tion in online examinations and presented a usability
analysis of using challenge questions as a second factor
authentication. The results of this study have been pre-
sented [7]. In them, we discussed the impact of the clar-
ity and memorability of questions on effectiveness of the
PBAF method. The study [7] also analysed participants’
feedback through an online survey to determine various
usability attributes as well as user satisfaction.
The current paper further explores the strengths and
weaknesses of the PBAF method in terms of usability,
security and the effect of question design on the overall
authentication process. In addition to the above, this
paper presents a detailed analysis of the security of the
PBAF method in a follow-up guessing authentication at-
tack to risk assess and mitigate any threat. Participants
of the follow-up abuse case scenario were selected from
the original users group, who participated in the previ-
ous phases of the study. The guessing attack was per-
formed to analyse the resilience of challenge questions
to informed guessing by friends and colleagues. The
findings also contributed to the design and implementa-
tion of a traffic light system in the PBAF.
The structure of the paper is organised into 5 sections.
The paper starts with an introduction to online learning,
examination and authentication challenges in Introduc-
tion. The work background and literature review is pre-
sented in Background and related work. The research
methodology including empirical design, participant re-
cruitment and empirical implementation phases are pre-
sented in Study design and methodology. The results,
analysis and findings of empirical investigations are dis-
cussed in Results. The concluding remarks including
work summary and future directions are presented in
Conclusion.
2. Background and related work
The online examination is an important feature and crit-
ical asset of online learning [8]. A number of previous
studies have acknowledged that student authentication
in online examinations faces many security threats. Un-
ethical conduct has been growing in online learning due
to un-controlled environment in online examinations as
a result of use of technology and the Internet [9,10].
Agulla [9] suggests that it can be a real challenge to ver-
ify the identity of an individual in an online environment
without any physical interaction. Colwell and Jenks [11]
argue that online examinations are more vulnerable to
academic dishonesty than traditional face-to-face exami-
nations. A large number of authentication techniqueshave therefore been developed, which can be imple-
mented to enhance the security of online examinations.
The traditional authentication techniques are classified
into three categories:
 Knowledge Based Authentication (KBA) e.g.
login-identifier and password, passphrase,
challenge questions
 Object Based Authentication (OBA) e.g. smart
cards, ID cards
 Characteristics Based Authentication (CBA) or
Biometrics e.g. fingerprint, audio or voice
recognition, signature recognition and face
recognition.
The above authentication techniques have their strengths
and weaknesses in terms of cost, usability and security,
when applied to online learning environments [6]. KBA are
the most prevalent, cost effective and widely accepted ap-
proaches [12]. However, KBA approaches can be vulner-
able to security attacks including collusion, guessing, lost
credentials, dictionary attacks and brute-force attacks [3].
The OBA approaches are widely used in banking, trans-
ports, hotels and parking areas, with a potential for use in
online learning [13]. The OBA features may be useful to
resist adversaries’ attacks. However, the authentication ob-
jects can be shared, lost or stolen for use in authentication
attacks. The OBA features require special purpose input
devices, which incurs additional cost. The use of special
purpose input devices may limit the implementation of
OBA in online learning environments. The CBA ap-
proaches free individuals from remembering passwords
and carrying cards. An individual’s physical or behavioural
characteristics are a key to the identification and therefore,
CBA (biometrics) are seen as the most reliable authentica-
tion features [14]. The CBA features also require special
purpose input devices for recording and authentication,
which incurs additional cost. The special purpose input de-
vices may limit the scope of CBA implementation in a
wider Internet context. The CBA approaches have been re-
ported with algorithm challenges like False Accept Rate
(FAR), False Reject Rate (FRR), Equal Error Rate (ERR),
Failure to Enrol Rate (FER) and Failure to Capture Rate
(FCR) [15].
In light of the above discussion, it is desirable to de-
velop an authentication feature, which is secure, cost ef-
fective and accessible to a large online population using
standard input devices. The authors designed and devel-
oped the PBAF method, which implements challenge
questions coupled with login-identifier and password
features for authentication purposes. The PBAF ap-
proach is chosen for a number of reasons. Primarily, the
PBAF integrates learning and the examination process,
whereby answers to profile questions collected in the
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the examination process. Unlike biometrics and object-
based methods, the PBAF, being a knowledge-based
method, can be implemented to cover a large online
population using standard input devices. The design, de-
velopment, implementation and maintenance of the PBAF
method can be cost effective. In our previous work, we:
 implemented the PBAF method in an online
learning environment, to authenticate students,
firstly at a course access level and secondly at
examination access level [6].
 organised an empirical study to research the
usability of the PBAF method in terms of
memorability of questions, clarity of questions,
syntactic variation and implementation of a traffic
light system [7].
 performed an in-depth analysis of the design of
questions and their impact on the usability attributes.
The study reported an analysis of completion time of
the profile questions and the results of a post study
survey to present participants’ feedback on layout and
usability [16].
The challenge questions are a key to the PBAF ap-
proach and are designed to be reliable and unique as
they pertain to information known to individual users. It
is widely seen as a credential recovery technique [17].
Challenge questions are also employed for customer
verification in online and telephone banking [18]. In a
recent study, Just and Aspinall [19] reviewed the use of
challenge questions as a second factor authentication in
10 UK banks, which indicated that the method was reli-
able and used for the security of monetary transactions
in financial institutions.
Besides the anticipated benefits, challenge questions
have some limitations. Some studies have reported us-
ability and security issues related to the use of challenge
questions in credential recovery [17,20]. In [17], it is also
argued that the collection of sensitive information about
users can raise privacy and ethical issues. The usability
of any authentication approach is highly important for
reliability and security. It is recognized that the memor-
ability of challenge questions and lack of clarity may
cause security and usability issues [7,21].
From the above discussion, it is evident that challenge
questions can be useful as a second factor authentica-
tion. However, to achieve effective authentication using
the PBAF method in online examinations, usability and
security issues need to be investigated.
2.1 Profile based authentication
The PBAF is a multi-factor knowledge based authentica-
tion approach, which utilises login-identifier and passwordand challenge questions. It integrates the learning and
examination processes, whereby answers to profile ques-
tions collected during learning activities are utilised for
authentication in the examination process.
Using the PBAF method, students are provided with a
unique login-identifier and password for logging into the
learning environment. After successful login, students
are required to answer profile questions in order to gain
access to learning resources. The profile questions are
used to collect answers in order to build and update in-
dividuals’ profiles. The profile is a student’s description
in the form of questions and answers. It is anticipated
that learning is a recurrent activity and the students’
profiles are consolidated in multiple visits. The second-
ary authentication process is triggered when students re-
quest to access an online examination. They are then
required to provide matching answers to a set of chal-
lenge questions randomly selected from their profiles.
The PBAF being a knowledge-based method can be im-
plemented to cover a large online population and may
provide adequate security against many authentication
attacks. The PBAF was implemented on a Modular Object
Oriented Dynamic Learning Environment (MOODLE)
Learning Management System (LMS) for the purpose of
this empirical study. MOODLE is a free source environ-
ment with a modular and extendable structure. A brief de-
scription of how the PBAF approach to student
authentication works can be found below:
 PBAF Setup: The PBAF provides a configurable web
interface. This is used to add pre-designed questions
to the library for use as profile and challenge
questions. The number of profile and challenge
questions requested at learning and authentication
phases are configurable items in this interface.
 Profile Questions: Profile questions are presented to
students in order to build their profiles. Each profile
question is presented to each individual student
once. The profile questions are a subset of
pre-designed questions added in the PBAF setup.
Students are required to supply answers to
these questions on each visit to obtain access to
learning resources.
 Challenge Questions: The PBAF generates and
presents random challenge questions when access to
online examination is requested. The student
registers n profile questions, and is presented with
t ≤ n challenge questions upon authentication [7,22].
To an individual student, r = t challenge questions
must be answered correctly in order to access online
examination. However, if an error tolerant traffic
light system is implemented, it is sufficient to
answer r ≤ t challenge questions correctly in order
to access online examination. The challenge
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point value v in the range 0 < = v < 1.0, which is
generated by MySQL database [23]. The students’
answers to challenge questions are authenticated
and a timestamp is stored with individual questions
in their respective profiles to exclude questions
presented within the past 24 hours.
 Traffic Light System: To relax the authentication
constraints for enhanced usability, a traffic light
system is embedded in the PBAF. The traffic light
system authenticates users based on the number of
correct answers to challenge questions. A three
scale classification is adopted to authenticate users,
which are red, amber and green. Users in the red
classification are locked out and denied access
to examination. Users in the amber classification
are presented more challenge questions to
re-authenticate and users in the green classification
are granted access to examination.
 Authentication: The authentication algorithm
implements string-to-string comparisons to match
the answers with the stored information. In earlier
studies, researchers used a combination of
algorithms for comparative analysis. In their work
Schechter et al. [20] implemented an equality
algorithm for string-to-string comparison, substring
algorithms, and distance algorithms were also used.
In another study, Just and Apsinall [24] proposed
guidelines for designing usable and secure challenge
questions which recommended removing white
spaces, punctuation and capitalization for enhanced
usability. The PBAF method implements the
equality algorithm for exact match without the
pre-processing of answers. The equality algorithm
was chosen for better security and to use the results
as a benchmark, which could be compared with
those from revised algorithms to be investigated in
future stages of this research. The nature of this
algorithm means that students are allowed to access
online examinations only if they provide exact
answers to their challenge questions. The PBAF
method implements randomization of questions
during multiple attempts and poses questions which
were not previously presented in the last 24 hours,
in order to be effective against security threats
including brute-force guessing attacks [25]. A
specific number of incorrect answers to challenge
questions locks out the user from further attempts
and requires administrator intervention to unlock
the account.
3. Study design and methodology
The aim of this study was to analyse the usability and
security of the PBAF method in the context of onlineexaminations. A set of 20 questions was compiled to
cover the academic, personal, contact, favourite and date
themes. The experiment was performed in an online en-
vironment and the empirical design and methodology
was approved by the University of Hertfordshire’s re-
search ethics committee. The study was conducted to
test the following hypotheses:
 The PBAF meets standard usability criteria of
efficiency and effectiveness.
 The traffic light system enhances the usability of
PBAF method by relaxing authentication constraints.
 The PBAF is secure against informed guessing
attacks by friends and colleagues.
The above hypotheses were framed to analyse the
usability attributes, which were informed by research
work in the domain of usability and software quality
[26,27]. Bevan [28] states that usability and quality com-
plement each other and that usability is quality in use.
As in [27], the quality factors include efficiency, effect-
iveness, satisfaction, accessibility, productivity, safety and
international-ability. In a similar vein, Nielsen [29] de-
fines usability as a property with multiple dimensions
each consisting of different components. He also sug-
gests that the different factors can conflict with each
other. Nielsen defined a number of usability factors in-
cluding learnability, efficiency, memorability, errors, and
satisfaction. Learnability defines, how well a new user
can use the system, while the efficient use of the system
by an expert is expressed by efficiency. Effectiveness is
the degree of accuracy and completeness with which the
user achieves a specified task in a certain context [20].
If a system is used occasionally the factor memorability
is used, which dictates effectiveness. Satisfaction is a
qualitative attribute which largely depends upon users’
feedback based on the effective and efficient use of
the artefact. The authors evaluate applicable usability
attributes in the context of online learning and exami-
nations, which include efficiency, effectiveness, satisfac-
tion and memorability of questions. In previous studies,
the authors evaluated user satisfaction [16] and memor-
ability [7] attributes, while this work analyses the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of challenge questions used in
the PBAF.
Previous research suggests that challenge questions can
be vulnerable to guessing attacks by friends and colleagues
[20,25]. Just and Aspinall [22] describe guessing in three
categories, which are “Blind guessing”, “Focused Guessing”
and “Observation”. In blind guessing, the attacker per-
forms a brute-force attack without considering the ques-
tion. In focused guessing, the attacker may still use a
brute-force technique, however, the search space is cut
down by considering the question type. In observation,
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user and question. Schechter [20] performed guessing
attacks by acquaintances and statistical guessing in the
context of credential recovery to evaluate security of
challenge questions. We organised an informed guess-
ing (observation) abuse case scenario in the context of
online learning and examinations using the PBAF
method. This study does not cover blind and focused
guessing. The abuse case was performed to assess risks
and mitigate any security threat using the method de-
fined by ISO 31000 [30].
3.1 Participants recruitment
The participants were recruited from a pool of local and
international undergraduate and postgraduate full time
students from the UK and overseas universities. All the
participants were informed and provided with study de-
sign and guidance notes explaining the aims and objec-
tives of this research. Guidance notes were emailed to all
participants to describe the registration procedure, ac-
cess dates for learning, and the examination. Of the total
30 potential participants, 23 consented to participate in
the experiment. In a follow-up abuse case scenario, we
circulated a list of 10 participants requesting them to
identify their colleagues and friends from the first co-
hort, who participated in the learning and examination
phases of the study. A total of 6 participants consented
to take part in the abuse case scenario. The participants
recruited for the abuse case scenario were required to
impersonate their friends and colleagues and attack the
online examination for security analysis.
3.2 Questions design
The questions for this empirical study were compiled into
five different themes i.e. academic, personal, favourite,
contact, and date themes. The question design in the aca-
demic and contact themes was based on the University of
Hertfordshire undergraduate admission form to minimize
any privacy concerns. Questions in the personal and
favourite themes were inspired from the corporate email
service providers i.e. Google, Microsoft, AOL and Yahoo
[20]. Usability, privacy and security were considered
when designing the questions. The findings from PBAF
adopting these questions will be used as a benchmark,
which can be compared and optimised in the future
stages of this research.
3.3 Empirical study phases
Our experiment was organised into five phases; setup
phase, online registration phase, online learning phase,
online examination phase and security test phase. The
empirical activities shown in Figure 1 were performed
remotely over the Internet in a simulated environment
on MOODLE LMS. The PBAF was developed in PHPserver side scripting language and integrated with the
LMS deployed on a test server for the purpose of this em-
pirical study. A simulation online learning course was
created on a remote server and a mock-up online exam-
ination added to the course. The online course and exam-
ination were designed only to achieve the research
objectives and was not an actual University course. Partic-
ipants were required to answer the profile and challenge
questions to authenticate their online examinations. The
experiment was performed in the phases described below.
Some initial configurations were performed in the initial
setup phase before the study commenced.
Initial Setup Phase: An initial setup was required to
set out values of the configurable variables. A set of 20
questions designed for the study was uploaded to the
PBAF. The number of profile questions presented during
the learning process is configurable and was set to 3.
The number of challenge questions presented during the
examination process is configurable and was set to 3.
The following traffic light configuration was defined:
1. Criteria 1-Red: If the number of matched answers to
the challenge questions is classified red, the
participant is locked out and access to online
examination is denied. The value of the red
classification was set to 0.
2. Criteria 2-Amber: If the number of matched
answers to the challenge questions is classified
amber, the participant is presented with more
challenge questions to authenticate iteratively. The
value of the amber classification was set to 1.
3. Criteria 3-Green: If the number of matched answers
to the challenge questions is classified green, the
participant is authenticated and access to online
examination is granted. The value of the green
classification was set to 2.
Online Registration Phase: The experiment was started
from the online registration phase as shown in Figure 1.
The participants completed the registration and created
their login-identifier and password. The login-identifier
and password provides the primary authentication to ac-
cess the simulation online course.
Online Learning Phase: The participants were re-
quired to access the LMS and visit the simulation online
course accessed for a period of one month with a mini-
mum of three days between each visit. As learning is a
recurrent process, therefore, participants were required
to visit the online course on multiple dates. The follow-
ing steps were performed in the online learning phase.
 The Participants accessed the online course using
their login-identifiers and passwords created in the
registration phase.
Figure 1 Empirical study phases.
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answer 3 profile questions in order to access the
online course. For the purpose of the study
reported here, the number of questions was set
to 3 in the initial setup phase. This would allow
the authors to collect sufficient data for the
preliminary analysis, without causing fatigue to
the participants.
 The profile questions and their answers were stored
in the database to build and consolidate individual
participant’s profiles.
Online Examination Phase: On completion of the on-
line learning phase, the participants were notified by
email to access the online examination. There was an
intervening period of 30 days between the participants’
first access to learning and the online examination
phases. The following steps were performed in the on-
line examination phase. The participants accessed the online course using
their login-identifier and password created in the
registration phase.
 When the participants visited the online
examination they were redirected to answer 3
challenge questions selected randomly from their
profiles, in order to assess their access status. The
challenge questions presented in the past 24 hours
were excluded to mitigate brute-force, blind and
focused guessing attacks.
 Authentication was performed using the equality
algorithm for string-to-string comparison. The
traffic light system was disabled in the participants’
first visit to the online examination for comparative
analysis of data with and without the traffic light
system. The participants were granted access to the
examination, when answers to all their 3 challenge
questions matched the stored credentials. In the
subsequent visits to online examinations, the traffic
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described below:
a) If the number of matched answers to the challenge
questions is classified as red, deny access and block
the participant’s account.
b) If the number of matched answers to challenge
questions is classified as amber, present more
challenge questions and repeat the authentication.
The amber classification is repeated until the status
is changed or all the challenge questions in the
individual’s profile are exhausted. Those participants
exhausting all their challenge questions are
locked out.
c) If the number of matched answers to the challenge
questions is classified as green, grant access to the
examination.
Security Test Phase: We conducted a follow-up study
for security assessment. An abuse case scenario was
performed to risk assess the PBAF approach against
guessing attacks. Research studies [20,25] suggest that
challenge questions can be vulnerable to blind, focused
and informed guessing attacks by adversaries, acquain-
tances, friends and colleagues. To evaluate the resili-
ence of challenge questions to informed guessing attack
by friends and colleagues, we performed an abuse case
scenario involving pairs of friends and colleagues from
the existing participants. As explained previously, this
study does not cover statistical, blind and focused guess-
ing. The use case presents a scenario, where an individual
obtains the login-identifier and password of a friend or
colleague, gains access to the online environment and per-
forms informed guessing to answer challenge questionsFigure 2 Traffic light system in online examination phase.during authentication. The following steps were taken to
perform the abuse case scenario:
 We required the participants to identify their friends
and colleagues from the first cohort participating
in the previous phases of the study. Of the first
cohort of 23 participants, a group of 6 volunteered
to take part in the abuse case scenario and notified
their friends.
 We paired the participants with their friends and
colleagues so each individual can cross attack a
friend’s account.
 Fictitious passwords were created for participants in
the abuse case scenario. The login-identifiers and
passwords of friends and colleagues were amended
for privacy reasons and shared with the designated
participants to enable them to impersonate as
their colleagues.
 The participants visited the course using their
friends’ login-identifier and password.
 The participants visited the online examination on
behalf of their friends and were presented with 3
random challenge questions. Answers to the
challenge questions were submitted using informed
guesses. The authentication feedback was not
revealed to the participants and stored in the
database for security analysis.
 The traffic light system was enabled using the
criteria outlined in the online examination phase.
Using the traffic light system, the participants
meeting the criteria in red classification were locked
out. The participants meeting the amber
classification criteria were recurrently presented
with more questions until the status was changed or





Academic questions Mean SD Mean SD
Find out about this course 14.14 7.98 7.0 6.11
Student number 14.55 8.52 3.0 2.9
Name of last school attended 14.60 6.67 14.86 9.38
Grades in highest qualification 15.14 6.29 2.0 2.47
Year of highest qualification 15.20 7.16 4.0 0
Month started the current course 15.61 8.06 5.0 2.03
Year started the current course 16.18 8.98 4.29 1.07
Highest qualification 16.93 6.80 9.40 8.47
Personal questions
Father’s surname 13.55 8.76 4.71 1.26
Country of birth 13.78 7.25 7.20 1.37
Best friend’s surname 14.47 6.95 5.79 2.57
Dream job as a child 18.03 8.65 9.85 5.24
Favourite questions
Hero of your childhood 14.70 5.94 11.71 5.31
Tutor 15.06 8.13 8 3.48
Module on this course 18.34 9.8 7.5 5
Contact questions
Home Tel no with country code 15.73 8.78 10.60 3
Home address town 16.83 9.36 15 13.75
House name or number 17.18 7.8 19.58 18.55
Mobile number with country code 17.43 8.98 11.69 1.43
Date questions
Date of birth 16.42 6.75 6.36 3.91





Answer length Pearson correlation 1 .152*
Sig. (2-tailed) .011
N 274 274
Completion time Pearson correlation .152* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .011
N 274 274
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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were exhausted. The participants meeting the red
classification criteria were locked out.
4. Results
Of all the invitees, 23 participated in the initial registra-
tion and 18 took part in the various phases of the empir-
ical study by providing answers to 274 profile questions.
A total of 13 participants answered 66 challenge ques-
tions in the online examination phase of the experiment
and completed the authentication.
A group of 6 students participated in a follow-up se-
curity test phase and submitted answers to 24 challenge
questions, guessing on behalf of their colleagues.
The usability and security analysis are discussed below.
4.1 Usability analysis
The usability results presented here are extracted from the
data taken from the participants’ interactions with the on-
line learning and examination phases discussed in Study
design and methodology. We have analysed the usability
of questions in the online examination and traffic light au-
thentication phases. In the online examination phase, par-
ticipants managed to submit 38 (58%) matched answers,
whereas, 28 (42%) unmatched due to various usability is-
sues. The efficiency and effectiveness of questions in the
context of online learning and examinations are evaluated
in the discussion below.
4.1.1 Efficiency
Efficiency is a usability metric defined by ISO, which can
be evaluated by measuring the completion time of each
task and sub-tasks separately [27]. A system is consid-
ered efficient, if users are able to complete tasks in a rea-
sonable time.
The efficiency was analysed from data collected during
participants’ answers to profile questions in the learning
phase. To examine the efficiency of questions in the PBAF
method, the “completion time” and “answer length” of an-
swers to profile questions were measured. The mean score
and standard deviation of completion time and answer
length was computed and presented in Table 1. The cor-
relation analysis of the two variables was measured to ana-
lyse the efficiency of profile questions used in this study. A
Pearson Correlation was computed to examine the rela-
tionship between the “completion time” and the “answer
length”. Table 2 shows the Pearson r =0.152; p value 0.011
(p < 0.05) indicates a significant correlation between the
two variables where n = 274. The small value of r = 0.152
suggests that there were other intervening variables affect-
ing the completion time, however, these are not covered
in this study. The potential factors that can impact the
completion time include typing speed, question relevance
to the individual, personal break, Internet connectionspeed and any privacy concerns. The efficiency of ques-
tions in various themes is discussed below.
Academic Questions: The relevance of questions is
important to inform the efficiency of the PBAF ap-
proach. The participants responded to pertinent aca-
demic questions, with an efficient completion time. As
an example, the completion time of answers to profile
questions “Where did you find out about this course”,
“student number” and “Last school attended” was the
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time of 14.14, 14.55 and 14.60 seconds, which indicates
that the relevance of questions is an important factor
leading to increased efficiency.
Questions with answer hints can also contribute to en-
hanced efficiency. The findings indicate that embedded
answer hints in questions were treated as an answer
choice by participants, which enhanced efficiency. As an
example, the profile question “Where did you find out
about this course”, shows a high degree of efficiency, be-
cause it was presented with an answer hint i.e. “Friend,
Internet” to help participants understand the context of
the question. Although the completion time of the ques-
tion was efficient, 78% of the answers were identical and
selected from the answer hint “Friend, Internet”, which
can be usable, but may lead to security risks.
The use of abbreviations in answers can affect the us-
ability of challenge questions. It was noted that in spite
of efficient completion time of 14.60 seconds, the length
of answers to question “Name of last school attended”,
was the largest in the academic theme. To account for
the length, further exploration of answers revealed that
44% of answers were abbreviations and 56% were full
school names. Long school names resulted in increased
answer length.
Question clarity is important for the efficient of re-
sponses. The completion time may increase for vague
and unclear questions irrespective of their answer
length. The completion time of answers to the profile
question “Grades in highest qualification”, was recorded
in 15.14 seconds. The completion time was higher for an
average answer length of 2 characters. The question does
not explicitly specify grade type, which resulted in varia-
tions in answers. The detailed sorting of answers re-
vealed that participant submitted different grade types
(letters, percentage and description). The answers con-
tained 64% letters “e.g. A, A*, A+”, 22% percentage type
and 14% descriptive texts.
Question context and relevance to individuals is highly
important for the usability of the PBAF method. The
profile question “Month started current course” was
completed in 15.61 seconds. The detailed analysis of an-
swers revealed that participants in the empirical study
were originally enrolled on different courses at their
respective institutions and questions in the context of
the empirical simulation course needed further clarity.
The participants were not particularly aware of “current
course” in the context of a simulation course and the
question vagueness contributed to delay in response
time. Of the total answers to this question requesting
“month” information, 50% were incorrect. A similar re-
sponse was noted to profile question “year started
current course” with a mean completion time of 16.18
seconds. The detailed exploration of answers revealed a28% “incorrect year” or unrealistic answers. The in-
creased completion time can be attributed to the rele-
vance and clarity issues reported above with respect to
“current course”.
Questions with long anticipated answers can affect the
usability. As an example, name of the institution or em-
ployers can be long and descriptive. The completion
time of profile question “highest qualification” was 16.93
seconds, which is the largest in the academic theme with
increased answer length.
Personal Questions: Personal questions are believed
to be usable and widely used by the corporate email pro-
viders e.g. AOL, Yahoo, Google and Microsoft [20]. Our
results indicate that the completion time of personal ques-
tions was efficient. The completion time of answers to
profile questions “Father’s surname”, “country of birth”
and “Best friend’s surname” was 13.55, 13.78 and 14.47
seconds and the answer length was 4.71, 7.20 and 5.79
characters. The average completion time of the questions
indicate slight variation with positive efficiency.
The personal questions requesting subjective informa-
tion from the past resulted in a high completion time.
As an example, the profile question “Dream job as child”
resulted in higher completion time and answer length as
18.03 seconds and 9.85 characters.
In conclusion, the mean time incurred on all questions
in the personal theme was 14.89 seconds, which is an ef-
ficient completion time in the online setting.
The results clearly indicate that better clarity and read-
ability of questions in the personal theme was one of the
factors resulting in enhanced efficiency.
Favourite Questions: Favourite questions have been
widely used for credential recovery [20]. The favourite
questions collect subjective information, which may
change over time and circumstances, however, popular
favourite questions can be usable. As an example, the
completion time of profile questions “Hero of childhood”
and “Tutor” was 14.70 and 15.06 seconds, which indi-
cates positive efficiency.
As discussed earlier, the question’s context and rele-
vance is highly important for better usability. As an ex-
ample, the completion time of the answer to profile
question favourite “Module on this course” was 18.03
seconds. The “module on this course” in question was
not relevant in the context of a simulation course
and lacks clarity. The analysis of data revealed that 47%
of answers contained unrealistic patterns like “NA, Nil,
and Unknown”.
A large number of questions requested subjective in-
formation; however, the overall efficiency of profile ques-
tions in the favourite theme was positive.
Contact Questions: The questions requesting contact
information were created in a more generic way, to
cover addresses for a wide range of participants in
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clarity issues. The completion times of answers to profile
questions “Telephone number including country code”
and “Address town” was 15.73, 16.83 seconds respect-
ively and answer length was 10.60, 15 characters. De-
tailed analysis of answers to “Address town” revealed
that 33% of all answers contained full address and
67% were address town or city name, which indicates
lack of clarity.
The completion time of answers to the profile ques-
tion “House name or number” was 17.18 seconds with
the largest answer length 19.58 characters. Analysis of
the answers revealed that the generalization of question
created ambiguity and answer lengths contained large
variations. Participants’ answers contained 42% full
home address, 25% house number, 17% home phone
number, 8% house name and 8% of city name, which
shows rapid answers shift.
From the above discussion, a pattern can be noticed in
answers to questions in the contact theme with increase
in completion time and answer length, which may also
affect the effectiveness during authentication process.
Date Questions: The date information is often pre-
sented and stored in varied formats. Without specifying
a format, collection of date information can invite syn-
tactic variation, which can affect the usability. The
completion time of answers to profile question “Date
of birth” was 16.42 seconds. The further analysis of
participants’ answers revealed that open and varied
“date” format was used in answers with the use of
special characters “/”, “-“ and descriptive “month name
e.g. October”. Using a standard date format can enhance
the efficiency of date type questions.
Summary of Efficiency: In summary, the completion
time reflects the efficiency and participants’ understand-
ing of questions and their ability to answer realistically.
Questions with design flaws require extra thinking and
time to respond and therefore it may result in distrac-
tion and have implications for the overall efficiency of
the PBAF method. The shortcomings in question design
may affect the efficiency of the PBAF and also reflect on
usability during online examination, which is discussed
below. Profile questions with an answer hint resulted in
efficient completion time; however, this approach can
create security risks.
The results reported here in terms of efficiency suggest
that the question design should consider clarity, rele-
vance and students’ anticipation to conveniently answer
the questions. Questions inviting long answers, as in the
contact theme, may incur extra completion time and re-
sult in low efficiency.
For the reasons covered in this section, the efficiency
hypothesis of the PBAF was supported for selective
questions used in this study. However, it would beinteresting to further investigate the efficiency of the
PBAF method and revise questions with enhanced clar-
ity in a real online course.
4.1.2 Effectiveness
Effectiveness may be considered to be the degree of ac-
curacy of responses. Effectiveness, in the context of
PBAF questions evaluation was taken to mean that par-
ticipants were able to submit a maximum number of
matched answers effectively with low error rate.
Effectiveness was analysed on data collected from
participants’ answers to challenge questions during the
online examination. To examine effectiveness and accur-
acy, participants’ answers to challenge questions were
analysed into 5 common themes as academic, personal,
contact, favourites and date. We used the equality algo-
rithm in the empirical study. However, results were
compiled to analyse the effectiveness if a more relaxed
algorithm was implemented. The results of a relaxed
algorithm were derived from the data collected in the
online examination disregarding capitalisation, white-
spaces and minor spelling errors using a combination of
substring and distance algorithm as described in an earl-
ier study [20]. Table 3 shows the crosstab analysis of
data using the equality and relaxed algorithms under
columns 3 to 6 headings. Data in columns 5 and 6 pre-
sented in bold-face show an increase in effectiveness
when results were computed using a relaxed algorithm.
The answers were submitted by all participants during
authentication before access to the online examination
was granted or denied. Since the challenge questions
were posed randomly, therefore, the sample distribution
was not uniform. The effectiveness of challenge ques-
tions using the equality and relaxed algorithms is dis-
cussed below.
Academic Questions: The relevance of questions
can be important to recall answers and inform the ef-
fectiveness of the PBAF approach. It was hoped that
questions with an answer hint would be easy to recall
during authentication. However, the challenge question
“Find about this course” received 2 (67%) matched an-
swers during authentication. The analysis of answers
revealed that one question failed to match as a result
of syntactic variation.
Question context and relevance to individuals is im-
portant in reproducing the exact answers during authen-
tication. The challenge question “Month started current
course” received 2(100%) unmatched answers. As re-
ported in the efficiency results, the text “current course”
in the question is not relevant in the context of a simu-
lation course, which led to usability issues.
Questions reported with clarity issues in the efficiency
analysis, resulted in low effectiveness. One of the most
obvious consequences of the question clarity can result
Table 3 Usability analysis: effectiveness
Question themes Effectiveness and accuracy
Equality algorithm Relaxed algorithm1
Academic
questions
N2 Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched
Student number 1 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%)
Year started the
current course
3 3(100%) 0(0%) 3(100%) 0(0%)
Year of highest
qualification
4 3(75%) 1(25%) 3(75%) 1(25%)
Highest
qualification
4 3(75%) 1(25%) 4(100%) 0(0%)
Find out about
this course
3 2(67%) 1(33%) 2(67%) 1(33%)
Name of last
school attended
5 3(60%) 2(40%) 4(80%) 1(20%)
Grades in highest
qualification
2 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%)
Month started
the current course
1 0(0%) 1(100%) 1(100%) 0(0%)




6 6(100%) 0(0%) 6(100%) 0(0%)
Country of birth 4 4(100%) 0(0%) 4(100%) 0(0%)
Father’s surname 3 2(67%) 1(33%) 3(100%) 0(0%)
Dream job as a
child
2 1(50%) 1(50%) 2(100%) 0(0%)
Total 13(87%) 2(13%) 15(100%) 0(0%)
Favourite questions
Tutor 6 1(17%) 5(83%) 5(83%) 1(17%)
Hero of your
childhood?
3 3(100%) 0(0%) 3(100%) 0(0%)
Module on this
course?
3 0(0%) 3(100%) 0(0%) 3(100%)
Total 4(33%) 8(67%) 8(67%) 4(33%)
Contact questions
Home Tel no with
country code
2 1(50%) 1(50%) 1(50%) 1(50%)
Home address
town
4 1(25%) 3(75%) 2(50%) 2(50%)
House name or
number




1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%)
Total 2(18%) 9(82%) 4(36%) 7(64%)
Date questions
Date of birth? 5 4(80%) 1(20%) 5(100%) 0(0%)
Grand total 66 38(58%) 28(42%) 50(76%) 16(24%)
1Disregard capitalization, whitespace and minor spelling errors.
2Number of challenge questions.
Data in bold-face show an increase in effectiveness when results were
computed using a relaxed algorithm.
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the online examination phase.
Using the equality algorithm, the challenge questions
in the academic theme received 15(65%) matched an-
swers and 8(35%) unmatched answers, which shows
acceptable effectiveness. However, there is a potential
to further improve the usability by addressing the is-
sues reported.
A more relaxed algorithm would increase the effect-
iveness of questions in the academic theme by 13%.
Manual sorting of the data revealed that 3 answers were
penalized for capitalization, spelling mistakes and spa-
cing, which would benefit from using the relaxed algo-
rithm. The implementation of the relaxed algorithm
would decrease the error rate and increase the effect-
iveness to 18(75%).
Personal Questions: Personal questions are believed
to be more memorable and therefore, widely used for
credential recovery [20]. The challenge questions in the
personal theme are reported with enhanced effective-
ness in the online examination phase. The challenge
questions “Best friend’s surname” and “Country of birth”
received 6 (100%) and 4 (100%) matched answers
during authentication, which shows a high degree of
effectiveness.
Syntactic variation including capitalization, spacing,
spellings, writing syntax, can affect the usability of open
text answers to challenge questions. The answers were
lexicographically correct, nevertheless, the string to
string match failed using the equality algorithm.
Using the equality algorithm, the challenge questions
in the personal theme received 13(87%) matched and 2
(13%) unmatched answers, which indicates a high degree
of effectiveness with a large number of accurate answers
during authentication.
A more relaxed algorithm would increase the effective-
ness of questions in the personal theme by 13%. Manual
sorting of the data revealed that 2 answers were penal-
ized for capitalization and spacing, which would benefit
from using the relaxed algorithm. The implementation
of the relaxed algorithm would decrease the error rate
and increase the effectiveness to 15(100%).
Favourite Questions: The challenge questions in the
favourite theme are a subset of personal questions,
which pertains to individual’s favourites. Popular chal-
lenge questions can be easy to recall. As an example,
the popular challenge question “Hero of childhood” re-
ceived 3(100%) matched answers during authentication,
which indicates a high degree of effectiveness. It was re-
ported with positive efficiency and submitted in the
shortest completion time in the favourite theme during
online learning.
Syntactic variation can increase the usability chal-
lenges. The challenge question “Tutor” received 5(83%)
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The analysis revealed that 80% of answers were lexico-
graphically correct; however the equality algorithm did
not produce an exact match.
The challenge question “module on this course” was
also reported with 3(100%) unmatched answers. The
analysis revealed a complete shift in the answer pattern
largely because of relevance and clarity issues reported
in the efficiency analysis. The results clearly indicate a
knock-on effect of unclear questions.
Using the equality algorithm, the challenge questions in
the favourite theme received 4(33%) matched and 8(67%)
unmatched answers, which indicates low effectiveness.
A more relaxed algorithm would increase the effective-
ness of questions in the favourite theme by 32%. Manual
sorting of the data revealed that 2 answers were penal-
ized for capitalization, which would benefit from using
the relaxed algorithm. The implementation of the re-
laxed algorithm would decrease the error rate and in-
crease the effectiveness to 8(66%).
Contact Questions: The challenge questions in the
contact theme were generalized for wider implementa-
tion. However, the generalization of questions created
ambiguity, which resulted in poor usability.
The ambiguous questions reported in the efficiency ana-
lysis, had a knock-on effect and resulted in low effective-
ness. The challenge question “Address town” received 1
(25%) matched answers. In a similar vein, the challenge
questions “House name or number” received 4 (100%) un-
matched answers, which indicates very low effectiveness.
The variation in answers reported in the efficiency analysis
increased the degree of difficulty for participants to pro-
duce the exact answers during the authentication phase.
Using the equality algorithm, the challenge questions
in the contact theme were reported with poor effective-
ness and received 9 (83%) unmatched answers, which in-
dicates a sharp decrease in effectiveness. Questions in
the contact theme were also reported with poor effi-
ciency in the preceding Section.
A more relaxed algorithm would increase the effective-
ness of questions in the contact theme by 18%. Manual
sorting of the data revealed that 2 answers were penal-
ized for spelling mistakes, which would benefit from
using the relaxed algorithm. The implementation of the
relaxed algorithm would decrease the error rate and
increase the effectiveness to 4 (36%).
Date Questions: The challenge question “Date of
birth” received 4 (80%) matched results during authenti-
cation. Syntactic variation in the date format was re-
ported in the efficiency analysis. The “Date of birth”
question received a single unmatched answer as a result
of syntactic variation in the date format. The date was
submitted in different formats such as “dd/mm/yyyy”,
“dd-mm-yyyy” and “day, month, year”.Using the equality algorithm, the challenge questions
in the date theme indicate a high degree of effectiveness
and no change was observed in the findings, if a more
relaxed algorithm was implemented.
Summary of Effectiveness: In summary, the results
that emerged from data analysis indicate a high number
of matched answers for academic, personal and date
themes. The questions with better relevance and clarity
were reported with a high degree of effectiveness. The
questions reported with low clarity, ambiguity and for-
mat issues had a knock-on effect during authentication
and resulted in poor effectiveness. The participants
failed to submit matched answers to a large number of
questions in the ‘favourite’ and ‘contact’ themes using
the equality algorithm implemented in empirical trail.
The effectiveness of questions in the context of this
study would further increase by 18%, if a more relaxed
algorithm was implemented to compensate for capital-
isation, spacing and spelling mistakes. The overall effect-
iveness will increase from 38 (58%) to 50 (76%), which is
a large increase.
It was observed that questions with objective informa-
tion remained efficient and effective during the learning
and (authentication) examination phases. Also, re-
sponses to subjective answers were frequently changing
during the learning and examinations phases resulted in
failed authentication.
Concluding this section, we can say that question de-
sign needs particular consideration to address clarity,
ambiguity and relevance to target users.
4.2 Traffic light system analysis
To address the usability challenges posed by the ques-
tion design, we developed and implemented a traffic
light system shown in Figure 2 and based on the cri-
teria outlined in Study design and methodology. The
data presented in Table 3, was collected from the PBAF
implementation, with and without the traffic light sys-
tem. The findings revealed that, before using the traffic
light system, 23% of the participants submitted exact
answers to all their 3 challenge questions and authenti-
cated successfully. Of the total answers submitted, 38%
participants provided exact answers to 2 out of 3 and
31% to 1 out of 3 challenge questions. However, 8% of
participants provided no matching answers to challenge
questions in the online examination phase. The reasons
for unmatched answers are discussed in the preceding
section. Before the traffic light system, the PBAF locked
out participants who failed to submit exact answers to
all of their 3 challenge questions. The participants, who
provided exact answers to 1 or 2 of their 3 challenge
questions, formed 69% (i.e. 31% + 38%) of the total un-
successful attempts largely because of usability issues
reported earlier.
Table 5 Security abuse case scenario and traffic light
Participants Attempt Matched Unmatched Authentication
P1 1st 0 3 Failed (Red)
P2 1st 0 3 Failed (Red)
P3 1st 0 3 Failed (Red)
P4 1st 1 2 Repeat (Amber)
P5 1st 1 2 Repeat (Amber)
P6 1st 1 2 Repeat (Amber)
P4 2nd 0 3 Failed (Red)
P5 2nd 0 3 Failed (Red)
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in order to minimize the usability issues, we set up the
traffic light system as shown in Figure 2. The system
employed a three scale criteria outlined in the study
methodology. The classification is setup to analyse PBAF
performance by relaxing the constraints for compensat-
ing the usability issues. This may create a usability and
security trade off, which needs further experimentation.
The results revealed that implementation of a traffic
light system improved authentication success rate and
minimized the impact of usability issues. A summary of
data ‘before’ and ‘after’ the traffic light implementation is
presented in Table 4. Overall, authentication success rate
for participants increased from 23% to 92% (61% + 31%).
The traffic light system can provide an enabling envir-
onment to reduce the usability challenges and enhance
the performance of the PBAF method. However, we are
aware that, with the implementation of such a traffic
light system, security analysis of the PBAF is warranted
on a larger sample size.
4.3 Security analysis
The security analysis presented here, is extracted from
the data taken from the participants’ interactions with
the security test phase described in Study design and
methodology. We have analysed the security of ques-
tions against informed guessing attacks. The security test
phase does not cover blind and focused guessing. An
abuse case scenario was performed to evaluate the se-
curity of questions used in this study.
4.3.1 Guessing by friends and colleagues
The analysis collected from the abuse case scenario is
presented in Tables 5 and 6. A total of 6 participants
made 9 attempts to guess the challenge questions on be-
half of their friends and colleagues. The participants
were allowed to perform multiple attempts if the traffic
light system criteria were met.
Table 5 shows analysis of abuse case scenario in terms
of participants’ attempts and traffic light results using
the equality algorithm. Of the 6 participants, 3 (50%)Table 4 Traffic light system
Authentication before traffic light system
Attempt 0/3 Matched 1/3 Matched 2/3 Matched 3/ 3 Matched
1 1(8%) 4(31%) 5(38%) 3(23%)
Authentication after traffic light system
Red Amber Green
0/3 Matched 1/3 Matched 2-3/3 Matched
1 1(8%) 4(31%) 8(61%)
2 0(0%) 2(12%) 3(19%)
3 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(12%)failed to guess matched answers to any of their challenge
questions on the 1st attempt and were classified red. The
remaining 3 (50%) participants guessed matched answers
to 1 out of 3 challenge questions and were classified
amber. Of the 3 participants’ classified amber, 1 dropped
out of the process and the remaining 2 completed the
abuse case scenario.
In the second attempt, 2 participants were presented
with more challenge questions for authentication and
failed to guess exact answers to any of these. They were
classified red and locked out.
Table 6 shows the crosstab analysis of abuse case sce-
nario using the equality and relaxed algorithms under
columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 headings. Data presented in bold-
face in column 5 and 6 shows any changes to security
level, when results were computed using the relaxed al-
gorithm. The participants were presented 24 challenge
questions randomly on behalf of their friends and col-
leagues. Using the equality algorithm, answers to 3
(13%) were successfully guessed by participants, whereas
21 (88%) of the answers failed to match their respective
profile answers. A more relaxed algorithm would in-
crease the number of matched answers to 5 (21%) at the
cost of increasing security risk.
To conclude this section, informed guessing by friends
and colleagues was not highly successful and partici-
pants could not authenticate. However, questions in the
public, friends and colleague domain were vulnerable to
guessing. The abuse case scenario is discussed below to
examine challenge questions in the individual themes.
Academic Questions: The participants submitted a
total of 13 answers to challenge questions in the aca-
demic theme. The participants successfully guessed one
answer in the academic theme.
It was anticipated that academic information would be
vulnerable to guessing by friends and colleagues. How-
ever, participants’ answers to a large number of the chal-
lenge questions failed to match.
Although, it was likely that challenge questions “Month
started current course” and “Year started current course”
could be guessed by individuals on the same course,




N Equality algorithm Relaxed algorithm
Academic
questions
Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched
Student number 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%)
Year started the
current course
3 0(0%) 3(100%) 0(0%) 3(100%)
Year of highest
qualification
1 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%)
Highest
qualification
2 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%)
Find out about
this course
0 *NA *NA *NA *NA
Name of last
school attended
2 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%)
Grades in highest
qualification
2 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%)
Month started
the current course
2 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%)




1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%)
Country of birth 2 1(50%) 1(50%) 2(100%) 0(0%)
Father’s surname 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 1(100%) 0(0%)
Dream job as
a child
0 *NA *NA *NA *NA
Total 1(25%) 3(75%) 3(75%) 1(25%)
Favourite questions
Tutor 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%)
Hero of your
childhood?
0 *NA *NA *NA *NA
Module on this
course?
1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%)
Total 0(0%) 2(100%) 0(0%) 2(100%)
Contact questions
Home tel no with
country code
1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%)
Home address
town
1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%)
House name or
number




1 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%)
Total 1(25%) 3(75%) 1(25%) 3(75%)
Date questions
Date of birth? 1 0(0%) 1(100%) 0(0%) 1(100%)
Grand total 24 3(13%) 21(88%) 5(21%) 19(79%)
*NA: Questions not presented due to randomization.
Data in bold-face show an increase in correct answers during abuse case when
results were computed using a relaxed algorithm.
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participants failed to produce matching answers to these
questions in all the 5 guesses.
The analysis of data using a more relaxed algorithm
shows no change in the findings. However, the detailed
exploration of the answers to challenge questions in
the academic theme indicates security vulnerabilities
and close guess possibilities by participants. A review
of the academic questions is recommended to mitigate
any risks.
Personal Questions: Participants submitted a total of 4
answers to challenge questions in the personal theme. It
was anticipated that answers to personal questions would
be by guessed by friends and colleagues. Schechter et al.
[20] argue that the personal information can be found on
the social media websites. Of all the personal challenge
questions posed during the abuse case scenario, partici-
pants managed to guess matched answer to one question.
Personal information such as country of birth and
place of birth can be vulnerable to informed guessing.
The use of questions in the public domain can be vul-
nerable to guessing. It may not be true for all, but trad-
itionally people use a common family and surname.
Jobling [31] indicates that from five thousand years ago,
fathers have passed their surname to children. The ana-
lysis of answers to profile question “Father’s surname” in
the learning phase revealed that, 64% of participants had
a common surname as their fathers’ and can be vulner-
able to guessing attack.
A more relaxed algorithm would increase the security
vulnerabilities of questions in the personal theme by
50% i.e. (75%-25%). Manual sorting of the data revealed
that 2 answers failed to match during the security attack
due to capitalization and spacing. The implementation
of the relaxed algorithm shows decrease in security and
increase in the number of matched answers from 1
(25%) to 3 (75%).
Favourite Questions: Participants submitted a total of
2 answers to challenge questions in the favourite theme.
Questions in the favourite theme are widely used for
credential recovery by email providers and banks. Al-
though, an earlier empirical study [20] indicates that
favourite questions are vulnerable to guessing, however,
our findings indicate that questions in the favourite
theme were resistant to an informed guessing attack.
The analysis of data in the favourite theme shows no
change to the results, when a more relaxed algorithm
was implemented.
Contact Questions: Participants submitted a total of 4
answers to challenge questions in the contact theme.
Questions in the contact theme are likely to be known to
friends and colleagues. Of all the challenge questions in
the contact theme posed during the abuse case scenario,
participants guessed matched answer to one question.
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numbers can be easily guessed by friends. It is likely that
the contact numbers for friends and colleagues are
stored in the phone or email address book and can be
used for a guessing attack.
The analysis of data in contact theme shows no change
to the results, when a more relaxed algorithm was
implemented.
Date Questions: Participants submitted a single answer
to challenge questions in the date theme. Although, “date
of birth” is likely to be known by friends and colleagues,
however, participants failed to guess a matched answer.
The analysis of data in date theme shows no change
to the results, when a more relaxed algorithm was
implemented.
Summary of Security Abuse Case: In summary, per-
sonal and academic questions are likely to be known to
friends and colleagues. The challenge questions in the
personal theme received one matched answer using an
informed guessing attack. The questions in the personal
theme were reported with positive efficiency, however,
answer to personal questions can be guessed by friends
and colleagues using the equality algorithm. Questions
in the contact and academic themes can also be prone
to guessing attacks by friends and family with one ques-
tion each being successfully guessed by friends and col-
leagues. Although, the use of a relaxed algorithm may
enhance the usability of challenge questions, however, it
can also increase the security risks.
As a consequence of guessable and weak challenge
questions and traffic light system, attackers may break
security of the PBAF to reach their target.
5. Conclusion
The PBAF technique is a multi-factor knowledge based
system, which uses challenge questions as repeat
authentication in addition to login-identifier and pass-
word for student authentication in the online examin-
ation context.
In this study, the PBAF approach implemented text
based academic, personal, favourite, contact and date
questions for student authentication. The findings from
the empirical study reported here suggest that challenge
questions based authentication in online examinations
can be an effective feature to resist adversaries’ attacks,
however, usability and security issues were reported in
selective questions when used in the PBAF.
The usability metrics efficiency and effectiveness were
evaluated. A large number of questions were reported
with efficient completion time. The questions reported
with clarity, ambiguity, relevance and format issues re-
sulted in low efficiency and failed authentication, which
also affected the effectiveness of the PBAF method. The
results that emerged from data analysis using theequality algorithm indicate a high number of matched
answers during authentication for academic, personal
and date themes. The participants failed to submit
matched answers to a large number of questions in the
favourite and contact themes. The majority of the ques-
tions reported with the clarity issues resulted in failed
authentication. The implementation of a more relaxed
algorithm to compensate for capitalisation, spelling mis-
takes and spacing, would further improve the usability
attributes. Question design has a measurable effect on
the overall usability and security of the PBAF approach,
which needs particular consideration to address clarity,
ambiguity, relevance, subjective, and objective informa-
tion. The subjective answers were frequently changing
with time and a shift in answers patterns was observed.
The findings of the study suggest that participants
may not provide 100% exact answers to all their 3
challenge questions set out for this work, largely because
of the usability challenges such as syntactic variation
and memorability issues. The implementation of a traffic
light system improved authentication outcome from
23% to 92%, by enabling multiple chances. However,
during the abuse case scenario, the traffic light algorithm
granted 2 out of 6 attackers a second chance to answer
more challenge questions in order to re-authenticate.
Nevertheless, the participants guessed correct answers
on behalf of their friends and colleagues, largely because
of poor question design.
The security abuse case analysis revealed that ques-
tions related to friends, colleagues and common public
knowledge can be a security risk. Some questions such
as “year of starting current course” or “father’s surname”
can be intelligently guessed which may pose security
threats. The overall results show a potential of using the
PBAF authentication for online examination. However,
secure and usable implementation of the PBAF method
largely depends upon the quality of question design.
While the initial results are promising, further re-
search is necessary to analyse question design and priv-
acy. Furthermore, the number of participants in this
study was small and more analysis is warranted on a lar-
ger sample size. There is a need to re-visit the design of
questions to balance the trade-off between usability and
security keeping in view the study results. The multiple
attempts in the traffic light system may encourage the
attacker to repeat the attack pattern. To prevent the at-
tacker from repeating the attack pattern, a password
change could be enforced in the future, if the student is
locked out due to attacker activities. Virzi’s empirical
study [32] on the number of subjects for usability iden-
tification indicates that as few as 5 users can identify
80% of the usability issues. However, a number of con-
clusions cannot be drawn reliably for challenge ques-
tions in this security analysis due to a small number of
Ullah et al. Journal of Internet Services and Applications 2014, 5:2 Page 16 of 16
http://www.jisajournal.com/content/5/1/2participants and therefore, it is imperative to verify the
security results in a real educational context on a larger
sample size.
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